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The hnhtre of IEumpean 
Navies 
by Joanna Kidd 
Introduction 
All navies' main task is to defend their coun-
try against attack from the sea by a potential 
enemy. A second major task for navies, with 
the entry into force in 1994 of the UN Con-
vention of the Law of the Sea, is to patrol 
and protect their maritime interests in their 
Economic Exclusion Zones. All European 
Union (EU) navies can carry out these two 
tasks, as they require similar naval forces, as 
did the Cold War. Then, the principal naval 
battle was envisaged as being a contest in 
blue water between Soviet and United States' 
(with some British and French support) 
nuclear powered submarines with other 
NATO allies protecting their coasts and their 
shipping from Soviet submarine attack. 
The end of the Cold War has placed quite 
different, and more secondary, demands on 
navies. Obviously they must still meet their 
primary tasks of defending their coastline and 
shipping. But, in order to carry out the mili-
tary interventions and campaigns likely in the 
post Cold War world any naval force needs to 
have the following four major capabilities: 
* Expeditionary warfare- the ability to 
transport rapidly very large numbers of 
troops and their supporting equipment, 
materiel and supplies; which requires 
dedicated sealift and support ships. Cargo 
and transport ships can be "taken up from 
trade" or hired from the commercial 
shipping market; but doing so takes much 
needed time and is difficult because such 
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ships are not specifically designed to 
convey military equipment. The slowness 
of operations using commercial ships can 
be illustrated by the Gulf War of 1990-
1991, when it took the United States 
almost six months to convey its military 
equipment by commercial shipping to 
Saudi Arabia. Both dedicated military 
shipping and commercial shipping also 
require to be escorted by frigates, 
destroyers or cruisers. 
* Power projection - the ability to project 
military power from the sea to the land; 
which requires land attack cruise missiles, 
sea borne aircraft and amphibious 
shipping. 
* Operations in the littoral- the ability to 
operate within approximately two hundred 
miles of the target state's coastline; which 
requires platforms, such as diesel subma 
rines and mine counter measure vessels, 
which can overcome the target state's sea 
denial strategy. 
* Embargo operations- the ability to stop, 
search and prohibit the entry to the target 
state of sea borne trade; which requires a 
large number of escorts (destroyers/ 
frigates/ corvettes). 
If taken as an entity, EU navies should be able 
successfully to carry out embargo operations 
and also should be able to operate in the 
littoral. But, they have very little ability to 
project power, especially when compared 
with the United States' navy, and even less 
ability to carry out expeditionary warfare. 
EU navies' strengths 
As can be seen from chart I below, EU navies 
are still geared, with their overwhelming 
emphasis on patrol craft, mine warfare ves-
sels and diesel submarines, to defending their 
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coasts. In regard to the four naval tasks 
outlined above, such an emphasis does, 
however, have some advantages. EU navies 
have considerably more capability than the US 
navy both to operate in the littoral and to 
carry out embargo operations. In fact, the US 
could probably not operate in the littoral 
without EU naval support, were it to face a 
sea denial strategy from the target state in the 
form of mines and diesel submarines. Al-
though it has the most advanced nuclear 
powered submarines in the world, they are 
not necessarily the best platforms with which 
to defend ones forces against enemy diesel 
submarines in the littoral. During the Kosovan 
conflict in I 999, for example, the US was so 
concerned at the threat posed to it from 
Yugoslavia's two elderly diesel submarines 
that a Dutch and an Italian diesel submarine 
were on permanent patrol in the Adriatic with 
orders to sink an enemy submarine as soon as 
it was detected. Similarly, the US navy could 
not, on its own, counter an enemy's substan-
tial mine threat as was evident in the Gulf 
War when two of her escorts were heavily 
damaged by Iraqi mines. 
EU navies' weaknesses 
Power projection by means of sea launched 
land attack missiles and aircraft is generally 
the preferred method of influencing a target 
state by naval means. When carrying out such 
operations one's forces do not have to oper-
ate in the littoral but can stand back several 
hundred miles from the coast at far less risk 
of attack. EU navies barely have the capabi 1-
ity to carry out such operations. The US has 
one hundred and thirty-three ships and sub-
marines which can launch Tomahawk land 
attack missiles, the EU currently has two 
(both UK nuclear powered submarines). The 
US also has twelve I OO,OOOt aircraft carriers; 
whereas France has one 40,000t and the UK 
has three 20,000t. 
The EU's ability to carry out expeditionary 
6 
warfare is even more limited. During the Cold 
War, as it was obvious that any war between 
the two sides would take place in central 
Europe, the bulk of western armies were 
stationed in central Europe. Therefore there 
was little need to transport troops and sup-
porting materiel by sea; so neither the US nor 
the EU navies had a large sealift capability. 
Consequently it took six months to transport 
the troops, stores and equipment to Saudi 
Arabia for Operation Desert Storm in I 990-
91. Realising that the lack of sealift was a 
major strategic liability the US, after the Gulf 
War, ordered nineteen very large sealift ships; 
hitherto nine have been delivered. Each ship 
is 62,000t and can transport fifty-eight tanks, 
forty-eight other vehicles and nine hundred 
trucks. Amongst EU navies only the UK has 
sealift ships, having ordered six ro-ro ferries. 
These, however, are very much smaller than 
their US equivalents, being only 23,0001. The 
weaknesses of European navies are illustrated 
by chart 2 below. 
Will matters improve? 
The EU navies are extremely unlikely to 
improve their capabilities in either expedition-
ary warfare or power projection. Power 
projection assets are expensive -the UK paid 
£ 130mn for a mere 65 Tomahawks and its 
future aircraft carrier is expected to cost 
£750mn just for the ship. In contrast, assets 
for coastal defence are cheap. Furthermore, 
the EU's defence procurement policies are far 
less efficient than the US', as most EU coun-
tries have their own shipyards and defence 
industries and so generally order from them, 
rather than procuring jointly in order to cut 
costs. Attempts at joint design and procure-
ment have been made, most noticeably the 
Horizon frigate programme of the UK, France 
and Italy. The three countries could not agree 
even on the basic design of the ship and the 
programme has been abandoned, with the UK 
now intent on designing and building its 
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future frigate on its own. EU navies might be 
able to increase their capabilities by assigning 
specific naval roles to certain countries for 
example, the UK and France could specialise 
in aircraft carriers and nuclear powered 
submarines; Germany and Italy escorts; the 
Scandinavian countries in diesel submarines 
and the Low countries in mine warfare. But 
unless all EU countries were always prepared 
to take military action together, a potential EU 
navy would lack key capabilities if certain 
countries did not take part. 
A further factor limiting the likelihood of 
EU navies having an expeditionary or power 
projecting capability is that only three EU 
countries have a tradition in such activities 
and subsequently have navies organised to 
carry them out. France, the UK, and to a 
lesser extent the Netherlands, have navies 
used to operating across the globe and carry-
ing out deployments of six to nine months. 
Other EU countries have no such experience 
of operating for long periods of time outside 
their own coastal waters. A vast change in 
both the organisation and the psyche of EU 
navies would be needed for them to carry out 
expeditionary warfare. There are a few 
indications that certain EU navies are begin-
ning to adapt to these new operational de-
mands - the German navy earlier this year 
deployed a small flotilla to South African 
waters for joint exercises and the Italian navy 
plans to become an all professional force by 
2006, for example. But, such moves are 
merely a start to a process of change which 
will take at least a decade to implement. 
In the medium term, therefore, the EU will 
not have a naval capability even one-tenth of 
the US' in terms of power projection and 
expeditionary warfare unless there is a mas-
sive increase in spending on naval platforms 
and weaponry. Such spending is almost 
certain not to happen. 
Europe's most numerous naval platform by 
far is the patrol craft, of which she has over 
three hundred and fifty. Their principal role 
has been to carry out sea denial operations 
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and as such they were procured in great 
numbers by smaller European navies during 
the Cold War as they were much cheaper 
platforms than diesel submarines. They are 
not wholly irrelevant to modern navies, as 
with the introduction in the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of two hundred mile 
economic exclusion zones many countries 
now have very large areas of sea to patrol. 
Patrol craft are the cheapest means of carry-
ing out this task and are obviously well suited 
to it. However, they are ill suited to the two 
secondary tasks, outlined above, which are 
placed on escorting ships. The proliferation 
of anti-ship missiles, diesel submarines and 
fighter aircraft means that escorting naval 
forces must be able to counter all these 
potential threats. Patrol craft are simply too 
small to be able to carry all the necessary 
weapons and command systems. Corvettes, if 
equipped with flexible vertical launch systems 
which allow a mixture of missiles to be 
carried, can carry out the task now required 
of escorts, but patrol craft cannot. 
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EUJmpea111 defe111ce a111d 
secUJrity capal]ility: 
lamlfmces 
by Phillip Mitchell 
Introduction 
The question on many people's minds over 
the past weeks and months has been "is it 
necessary or indeed possible to have a genu-
ine, independent European defence and secu-
rity capability?" NATO and the US have after 
all provided our security for over 50 years. 
The answer or answers are, of course, seen 
not only in the Kosovo operation but also in 
the unwillingness of Europe to adequately 
share the defence burden with our American 
allies. This, to put it mildly, has resulted in 
considerable disenchantment within the US 
administration. If we Europeans do not do 
more the Americans assuredly are going to do 
less, thereby weakening NATO and Europe. 
Europe vs. the US 
The UK's Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir 
Charles Guthrie, during a presentation to the 
Royal United Services Institute, provided 
some rather telling statistics in respect of the 
current European defence capability. These 
figures follow very closely those provided by 
the International Institute for Strategic Stud-
ies in their annual publication The Military 
Balance 1999/2000. Consider the following 
examples: 
* The EU can place some 1.78 million people 
under arms; European NATO (excl. Tur 
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key) about 2 million; the US about 1.37 
million. 
* The Europeans have 5 military satellites, 
the US 64. 
* Britain and France have 4 carrier task 
groups, the US I 2. 
* Europe does not have a single strategic lift 
aircraft, the US 332. 
* When it comes to defence spending, the 
US with just over a third of the population 
of NATO, provides over a half of the 
defence spending. US defence spending 
per capita is approximately 125% higher 
than the Europeans. Nevertheless, both 
France and Germany are looking at cutting 
around 3.5% from their defence budgets 
this year. 
In anybody's language this must mean that 
Europe has got to do far more. Consider this 
one single fact- out of 2 million European 
NATO servicemen, Europe found it difficult 
to provide 2% of them for the Kosovo opera-
tion. The German minister of defence re-
cently stated that: "The problem in Europe is 
not too much America, but too little Europe". 
land forces in Europe 
It should not be forgotten that the European 
union comprises some 15 nations. Eleven of 
these 15 are members of NATO. NATO in 
turn has a membership of 19 countries, eight 
of whom are not members of the European 
union. Therein lie the dilemmas in the search 
for a European security identity: Can the 
European countries outside of NATO be easily 
and quickly drawn into the planning process? 
Will the primacy of NATO be devalued? 
Whilst the military and political debate will go 
on for some time yet, we should as of now be 
taking a much closer look at land forces in 
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relation to that European defence capability. 
Readers will, of course, be aware that 
European defence capability has to be built 
within constraints imposed by the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, more 
commonly referred to as CFE. The CFE 
Treaty was signed in Paris on 19 November 
1990 and extends conventional arms control 
from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. It 
would be true to say that the Treaty is gener-
ally regarded as a cornerstone of post-Cold 
War European security. The area of applica-
tion includes all the land territory of the 17 
European members of NATO and the remain-
ing I 0 CFE successors to the original Warsaw 
Treaty signatories. Forces of the United 
States and Canada stationed in this area are 
also subject to the agreement. 
In essence the Treaty imposed equal limits 
of 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armoured combat 
vehicles, 20,000 heavy artillery pieces, 6,800 
combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters 
- that the two "groups of states" (NATO and 
Warsaw Pact) could deploy and store be-
tween the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Moun-
tains. 
It is not the intention of this article to 
cover the Treaty in detail. However, it is 
worth bearing in mind that the signatory 
states have removed over 58,000 pieces of 
Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) from their 
arsenals, mostly through destruction. The 
Treaty also introduced an unprecedented 
degree of military transparency through 
detailed information exchange on military 
command structures and arms levels, as well 
as an extensive inspection regime. 
Of course the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union and the demise of its partner 
group the Warsaw Pact led inevitably to calls 
for the Treaty to be amended to reflect post-
Cold War Europe. This was achieved on 19 
November last year when national and territo-
rial ceilings were established for TLE. These 
replaced the original group and zone limita-
tions. Restrictions on the build-up of forces 
in specific regions (particularly central Eu-
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rope) and confidence through transparency 
are also part of the adapted treaty's founda-
tions. It should be noted that the specific 
limits for all 5 categories of TLE are in many 
cases lower than that allowed under the 
original treaty. The problem is, when consid-
ering European defence capability, that the 
equipment holdings of many states are even 
lower than that required by the treaty. As an 
example- Belgium is allowed a total of 300 
tanks -currently she holds 155. Whilst 
Norway is up to strength in main battle tanks, 
holdings of TLE in all other categories are 
below agreed ceilings. 
Equiornent llo!ding 
ACV 218 
Artillery 189 
Attack Helicopters 0 
Combat Aircraft 73 
(ACV = Armoured Combat Vehicle) 
Ceiling 
275 
491 
24 
100 
It can be claimed that this adapted treaty will 
not resolve the interstate and secessionist 
conflicts that have plagued post-Cold War 
Europe. Indeed, it is Europe's attempts to 
solve these problems within the framework of 
the CFE Treaty that now exercise the minds 
of our leaders. Perhaps they should also 
consider how in the event of a major crisis, 
NATO countries will meet the equipment 
shortfall. 
What can the EU provide in respect of 
armed forces? 
There is no doubt that too many of Europe's 
armed forces are still focused on Cold War 
requirements. Today we require forces that 
are deployable and sustainable. Moreover, 
they need to be highly mobile and flexible. As 
already mentioned, there are 2 million Euro-
pean NATO servicemen. The fact that a large 
proportion of them are still conscripted 
represents a significant factor. Thus they are 
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of limited use both in terms of their deploy-
ment outside home territories and being 
sufficiently well trained to engage in a wide 
range of operations using modern weapons 
and equipment. The fact of the matter is that 
European countries have a particular problem 
in not having sufficient numbers of profes-
sionals, particularly specialists, to sustain a 
combined arms offensive operation of any 
signit1cant size. Whilst it is true that con-
scripts from both Germany and Norway have 
served in Bosnia and Kosovo, these were 
volunteers and relatively few in number. 
Professionalisation of NATO's remaining 
conscript armies will increase the number of 
deployable soldiers, permit rotation and 
improve overstretch. Additional important 
factors include the professional soldiers 
ability to take full advantage of technological 
improvements in weaponry and greater unit 
cohesion. none of which can be obtained in 9 
months of "conscript service.'~ 
Could we form a European army? 
Romano Prodi, the European Commission 
president, says no. Indeed no one of authority 
in Britain is talking of a European army. 
Nations will want to retain authority over 
their armed forces and only national govern-
ments and national parliaments should have 
the authority to send their forces into areas 
where they may risk their lives. 
Europe has in fact recognised its weakness 
and taken some steps to strengthen its capa-
bility. At the EU summit of December last 
year it was agreed to create within 3 years a 
rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops that 
would be available for a variety of missions 
within 60 days, when NATO as a whole is not 
engaged. The force would not be a European 
army; rather it would cover anything from 
humanitarian relief to peace support opera-
tions. Member nations would voluntarily 
contribute forces. 
So here we are, 6 months later, and still no 
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clearer as to how this figure of 60,000 sol-
diers is to be met. The UK and France are 
thought to be ready to assign 2 - 3 brigades 
apiece, each of up to 5,000 soldiers, account-
ing for some 20- 30,000 troops, but their EU 
counterparts have so far been very shy about 
declaring their hands. It is perhaps unfortu-
nate that the target number of brigades - 15 -
corresponds to the number of EU member 
states - since quite realistically it is now 
being spell out that the headline goal of 
60,000 requires that the overall number be 
tripled to allow for force rotation. Can Eu-
rope find 180 - 200,000 troops? On top of 
this of course is the need for these forces to 
be equipped and supported with up-to-date 
equipment. There are deficiencies in this 
respect throughout Europe - and problems 
with the UK 's infantry weapons and Tornado 
bomber fleet leave little scope for British self-
satisfaction. At this point one might well 
agree with the French newspaper "Le 
Figaro", which described the EU as an "eco-
nomic giant, a political dwarf and a military 
larvae''. 
The European Corps - or EUROCORPS-
has been put forward as an embryonic Euro-
pean rapid reaction force. EUROCORPS was 
founded in 1992 on a French and German 
initiative and has its headquarters in Stras-
bourg. It can be described as an adoptive 
rather than a natural child of NATO. The 
problem here is that it has developed away 
from the mainstream of NATO and is a fully 
multinational headquarters rather than one 
dominated by a single or lead nation. Only 
last year did the Eurocorps bow to the 
commonsense inevitability of accepting 
English as a headquarters language. The point 
of highlighting "lead nation" is because in the 
KFOR operation successive and successful 
force headquarters have been led by the 
ARRC under General Sir Mike Jackson and 
LANDCENT under German General Klaus 
Reinhardt. EUROCORPS has now been given 
the opportunity to command KFOR and 
despite its imperfections could be the nucleus 
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of Europe's developing capability. The KFOR 
experience will certainly enhance Corps-
NATO compatibility, however whether 
EUROCORPS could become the second 
ARRC is still open to question. 
The capability gap between ourselves and 
the United States has already been commented 
on. Moreover, this gap is growing increas-
ingly wider. Europe needs to narrow it. We 
have to deliver forces configured for expedi-
tionary operations or NATO and Europe could 
be irrevocably damaged. The reality is how-
ever described by General Klaus Naumann 
former chairman of NATO's military commit-
tee when he stated that "The European Un-
ion's plan to create a viable rapid reaction 
force for crisis management by 2003 is 
unlikely to be achieved on time." 
*** 
This article has presented a brief outline of 
European land force capability which hope-
fully has given a flavour of some of the 
problems that lie ahead, problems that in later 
years members of the Norwegian armed 
forces may be called upon to help solve. 
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Cum:mt tre111ds i111 the 
Russicm Navy 
by Joanna Kidd 
Introduction 
The most obvious trend in the Russian navy 
over the past decade has been decline: De-
cline in numbers of ships and submarines; 
time spent at sea; overseas deployments; 
manpower; building of new ships and subma-
rines; and of course in funding. This article 
will review the overall decline in the navy's 
strength, but will argue that, with the 
Vladimir Putin presidency, the decline has 
most probably reached a plateau. The prob-
able levelling off of the decline can be traced 
to three factors: 
* Firstly, that President Putin is continuing, 
but in a much more assertive way, to 
reorganise the Russian military and so far 
this year has already promulgated a new 
national security concept and a new naval 
doctrine. 
* Secondly, President Putin is intent on 
restoring an ocean going capability to the 
navy because he is determined both to 
promote and defend Russia's interests on 
the high seas and because he is impressed 
by the navy's leaders, particularly its head, 
Admiral Kuroyedov. 
* Thirdly, that Russia's economy is now 
growing, albeit not rapidly, so that more 
money is available to the central govern-
ment to spend on defence. 
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Overall decline 
Overall decline in strength has not been 
limited to the Russian navy alone; all major 
western navies have reduced their strength 
very considerably as the "peace dividend" has 
been called in. The US navy, for example, 
now has about two hundred submarines and 
principal surface combatants whereas in 1990 
it had about three hundred and fifty, and 
some missions deemed essential a decade ago 
are now being scrapped. However, the Rus-
sian navy's decline has been so precipitous as 
to stand out from this general trend. 
Strengths in some areas such as frigates and 
diesel submarines are now about one tenth of 
the 1990 numbers and all types of submarines 
and surface combatants have declined in 
numbers by half, and many by three quarters, 
since then (see chart 3 below). Furthermore, 
no new principal surface combatant has been 
launched since 1993 and no new attack 
submarine since 1994, so the fleet is an 
ageing one. 
Operational Decline 
As important as the decline in numerical 
strength has been the decline in the opera-
tional capability of the ships and submarines 
left in the inventory. Even though there are 
now far fewer ships and submarines to 
maintain than a decade ago, the Russian navy 
has been barely able to afford to pay for the 
fuel, electricity and shore maintenance to 
keep their depleted inventory seaworthy. Time 
spent at sea by both submarines and ships has 
declined very considerably; the United States' 
State Department reported that in 1998 sea 
duty for fleet submarines fell by 25% and for 
surface vessels by 33% in that year alone; the 
fiscal situation for the navy was described as 
"dismal". An example of how strained the 
situation has been can be indicated in that the 
Northern Fleet in June 1999 carried out 
"West-99", a major strategic command and 
13 
staff exercise, and in so doing used up its 
entire annual fuel reserve. Lack of money for 
fuel is a problem shared by many western 
navies- the Royal Navy being particularly 
badly affected - but not to the same extent as 
the Russian navy. During the Kosovan crisis 
in 1999 the Russian Defence Ministry and the 
Black Sea Fleet several times publicly stated 
that a flotilla of surface ships would be sent 
to the Adriatic. However, throughout the 
crisis the navy was able to deploy only one 
surface ship, an intelligence ship, to the 
region. Presumably the navy could not afford, 
even during such a conflict, to send any more 
ships to sea. This lessening ability to send 
ships or submarines to sea has also had 
severe effects on the fighting efficiency of 
personnel, which has declined commensu-
rately. 
New Strategic Doctrine 
Putin 's more vigorous approach to reorgani-
sation of the military has already been shown 
this year. On 14•• January 2000 Russia pub-
lished a new National Security Concept. The 
Concept has been widely interpreted as 
increasing the emphasis on the role of nuclear 
weapons, in part because of the depleted 
condition of her conventional forces, in the 
defence of Russia should she be attacked. 
This shift in emphasis has significant implica-
tions for the Russian navy as, if implemented, 
the Start II provisions will ensure that by 
2003 60% of Russia's nuclear missiles will be 
carried by her nuclear powered ballistic 
missile carrying submarines (SSBNs), as 
opposed to 43% now. In line with this new 
strategic concept, a new naval doctrine was 
published on 4'• March 2000. It reflects the 
increased importance of SSBNs by making 
"the maintenance and qualitative renewal of 
the men and equipment of the naval strategic 
forces component, and the guarantee of their 
required level" the main priority for the navy. 
Some additional money has been given to the 
navy in order to fulfil her increased strategic 
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role. At present, it is intended to keep only 
the seven Delta IV SSBNs in service and their 
refitting, being undertaken now, will probably 
use almost all of the naval strategic budget. 
The earlier Delta classes are being scrapped 
and there is no money to keep the Typhoon 
SSBNs in service for more than a few years. 
More importantly, the Delta IV SSBNs will 
have to start being withdrawn from service in 
2015 due to their age. Their intended replace-
ment, the Borey class, which is still in devel-
opment, has chronic design problems. Unless 
very considerable resources are given to the 
Borey project within the next five years, by 
20 I 5-2020 the Russian navy will not have any 
SSBNs. The new naval doctrine does make 
"developing new generation strategic missile 
submarines, modernising and repairing exist-
ing submarines of this class, and developing 
and producing missiles for them" the navy's 
priority over all other platforms and weapons 
so one would assume that money will be 
found to resolve the developmental problems 
with the Borey class. 
Basing of the remaining SSBNs has been 
stated publicly to remain shared between both 
the Northern and the Pacific Fleets despite 
persistent rumours that the strategic element 
was going to be removed from the latter. As 
Admiral Kuroyedov, head of the Russian navy 
said on 27'• August 1998, "On the question of 
submarines [ ... ] I will repeat that the naval 
strategic component consists of two fleets, 
and this will continue to be the case". How-
ever, in the same speech he also stated that, 
"There is a plan to create a northern strategic 
bastion of Russia. That idea has now to be 
developed into a blueprint." It would appear 
that this blueprint is now part of the wider 
plans for military reform, and so remains to 
be implemented. 
Other Priorities in the New Naval Doc-
trine 
Although primarily a land based power, 
Russia has an extensive coastline; maritime 
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borders with several states; a very large 
economic excJusion zone; carries out consid~ 
erable seaborne trade; and still has a large 
ocean going merchant fleet. For these reasons 
it is in Russia's strategic interests to have an 
ocean going navy. The doctrine reflects these 
interests by stating that "Russia's interests on 
the world ocean stipulate that in the political 
sphere her naval priorities" should be: 
* To ensure the Russian Federation's 
guaranteed access to the world's oceans 
and spaces 
* To exclude discriminatory actions with 
regard to it or its allies by individual states 
or military political blocs 
* To prevent the domination of any states of 
military political blocs whatsoever on the 
world's oceans spaces, which have 
important significance for the realisation 
of Russian Federation state interests, 
especially in the adjacent seas 
* To settle existing political and 
international legal problems of the use of 
the world ocean on terms that are 
advantageous for the country 
* To focus the efforts of the states on the 
peaceful exploration and use of the world 
ocean 
Obviously, Russia has not suddenly acquired 
these maritime interests; it has had them 
during the past decade of decline. However, 
certain factors such as the embarrassment of 
her failure to send more than one ship to the 
Adriatic during the Kosovan crisis in 1999 
compared to NATO's fleet of more than forty 
ships and submarines and the fact that several 
Russian tankers have been detained in the 
Gulf by US naval ships carrying out the 
embargo of Iraqi oil have increased the 
importance attached by the Kremlin to naval 
matters. The naval doctrine expands upon this 
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by stating that "the urgency of the defence of 
Russian Federation state interests on the 
world ocean is increasing as a result of a 
substantial change of the geopolitical situation 
in the world and the emergence of new 
threats to Russian Federation security in the 
sphere of naval activity." It states that the 
primary threats are: 
* The restriction of the opportunity for the 
Russian Federation to access the world 
ocean's resources and spaces and major 
international sea lines of communication, 
especially in the Baltic and Black Seas 
• The stepping up of the leading naval 
powers' naval activities, the change of the 
correlation of naval forces not in favour of 
the Russian Federation, and the 
improvement of the military capabilities of 
the naval forces of the leading foreign 
states, and economic, political and 
international-legal pressure on the Russian 
Federation with the goal of restricting its 
naval activity 
* The expansion of the scale of unauthorised 
harvesting of the country's natural 
maritime resources, and the dramatic 
growth of foreign influence on its naval 
activity 
* The unresolved nature of an entire series 
of complex international-legal issues, 
which affect, first and foremost, the legal 
status of the Caspian and Black Seas, and 
the Sea of Azov, and the presence of 
territorial claims against the Russian 
Federation by a number of neighbouring 
states 
* The increase of the rates of lag of the 
qualitative indicators of Russian naval 
weapons behind foreign states' naval 
weapons 
15 
Future Plans 
In order to start combatting these perceived 
threats, President Putin announced to the 
Russian Security Council on 23'' November 
1999 that the navy is to resume operations in 
areas of the world not visited in recent years, 
most particularly the Baltic and the Mediterra-
nean. The navy's biggest surface combatant, 
the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov, is supposed to 
deploy to the Mediterranean in August and 
September 2000, accompanied by a destroyer, 
a frigate and a support tanker. The navy's 
share of the 2000 defence budget has been 
increased, so one would expect that the 
deployment will be able to be paid for. Obvi-
ously, one prominent deployment does not 
mean that the Russian navy has reversed its 
decline -the Kuznetsov did deploy in 1996, 
for example,- but it is perhaps an indication 
that the end of its nadir has been reached. 
A very large and sustained increase in the 
navy's budget will be required to make the 
entire fleet seaworthy. The Russian economy 
is growing and, if the navy remains a priority 
for Putin, one would expect the navy's 
budget to continue to increase. However, it is 
unlikely that the budget will be expanded to 
such an extent that all the fleet will be made 
seaworthy within the life span of the doctrine 
i.e. to 20 I 0. Priorities for the navy, after the 
strategic submarines, which are separately 
funded, would probably be attack submarines, 
guided missile destroyers and frigates, the 
Kuznetsov and support ships to enable global 
deployments. The doctrine itself is somewhat 
more ambitious, stating that, for Russia's 
naval threats to be met, the following must be 
carried out: 
* Building attack submarines and surface 
ships, including aircraft carriers, with 
enhanced combat capabilities equipped 
with precision-guided strike missiles and 
anti-submarines warfare weapons. 
* Developing ship and shore based multirole 
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aircraft and standardised shore based 
reconnaissance strike systems 
* Focusing efforts on restoring, 
modernizing, and maintaining the combat 
readiness of existing military systems, 
complexes and weapons. 
* Equipping primarily constant readiness 
formations and units with modem 
weapons and military equipment 
* Reducing the product list of naval 
equipment and weapons, shifting to the 
construction of standardized combatants, 
support vessels. 
* Enhancing the combat potential of naval 
force groupings by building up the strike, 
information and other capabilities of naval 
equipment and weapons 
* Enhancing the efficiency, reliability, 
secrecy, and stability of communications 
and command and control 
* Exploring and equipping the world ocean 
as a possible sphere for the conduct of 
combat operations through the creation 
and deployment of a unified situation 
coverage system on the world ocean 
Such a list is in line with the ambitions of 
medium sized western navies such as the 
UK's and France's. Indeed, it is noticeable 
that the current size and structure of the 
Russian navy is not that dissimilar from the 
Royal Navy's: in terms of principal surface 
combatants they are almost exactly the same. 
Russia retains a considerable advantage in 
submarines, her traditional strength, but is 
likely to reduce these numbers further in the 
near future although still retaining her relative 
lead (see chart 4 below). 
Should the Russian economy keep growing 
and if the central government retains a mod-
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erately reformist outlook, in the long term 
one would imagine that the Russian navy will 
keep its current size and structure, but will 
significantly improve its operational capability 
so that its inventory is seaworthy. Regional 
deployments, particularly by surface combat-
ants, to neighbouring seas and also to areas 
of strategic interest such as the Gulf could 
then be carried out on a regular basis so as to 
maintain and increase Russia's maritime 
interests. 
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Chart 3 
Russian Naval Strength 
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